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KEYAN G TOMASELLI
INDETERMINACY, INDIGENEITY, PEER REVIEW AND 
THE MIND–BODY PROBLEM
BACKGROUND
Declining funding over the past decade for tertiary education in South Africa resulted in tens of 
thousands of disillusioned students engaging in national protests during 2015 and 2016.1 The 
grievances were many, but included de-colonisation of curricula, together with a call that linked 
peer review to perceived forms of Eurocentric gatekeeping. This paper examines this claim in 
the context of assertions of “African ways of making sense” in relation to post-Enlightenment 
philosophy. 
For the purposes of this analysis, indigeneity involves the contemporary performance of self 
by specific groups alienated from Western epistemologies, procedures and practices. These 
intellectual constituencies often claim ‘epistemic injustice’ in peer reviewing, and their response 
is to demand a restoration of relations with the group’s imagined past. Given that the Indigene’s 
historically unacknowledged claim to political primacy casts the constitutionality of all frameworks 
of relation in crisis, what are appropriate bases for peer review? My analysis examines how the 
relationships of self-proclaimed Indigenous African communities function in a contemporary era of 
ideological concern conceived largely through Western practices.2
Whiteness, de-colonisation, de-Westernisation, indigenisation, transformation and epistemic 
resistance are a few recent terms, some more intellectually coherent than others, generated 
from the academic peripheries (both geographical and epistemological) with a view to challenging 
Western epistemological Enlightenment assumptions. These assumptions have been in some 
instances described as “epistemic injustices.” Injustice in this sense occurs when someone 
feels wronged in their capacity as a knower.3 A recurring example is when article submissions are 
rejected or returned for substantive revision because they are written in styles that differ from the 
‘Western’ norm. It is argued that when applied instrumentally, this norm exerts a deflationary and 
even discrediting effect on the authors concerned. However, when an argument is based on the 
proposition “you are what you know,” it becomes difficult to engage, critique or refute.
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In approaching this vexed topic, let me start with three quotations about the idea of transformation 
– which, in the South African context, is often linked with the rhetoric of indigenous knowledge 
systems (IKS) that were largely suppressed and regarded as superstition during the colonial era. 
The first is by Jonathan Jansen, at the time vice-chancellor of the University of the Free State, 
a formerly white, Afrikaans-speaking institution riven with racial tensions during the early post-
apartheid era. Jansen, the university’s first black vice-chancellor, observed that the “new racial 
nationalists are impatient and want short cuts … [U]niversities must be challenged to deal with 
the very real problem of racial gatekeeping and the spectacular lack of imagination in slowly but 
systematically building the next generation of especially black and women professors.”4 
Second, Nomalanga Mkhize, a lecturer in history at Rhodes University, points out that
[s]ome critics opposed to curriculum transformation confuse “curriculum decolonisation” with 
“curriculum displacement”. Some of the most reactionary critics within the university sector 
are, on the one end, conservative academics who fear the demotion of the European scholarly 
canon. On the other end, are the so-called left wing radicals who interpret transformation as a 
“narrow racial project” that is driven by “identity politics”.5
Third, according to Belinda Bozzoli, the liberal Democratic Alliance’s shadow minister for Education, 
a previous deputy vice-chancellor at the University of the Witwatersrand and a sociologist, “the 
word ‘transformation’ fails utterly to capture the depth of the problem of University staffing (which 
has failed to keep up with student enrolment). The meaningless and authoritarian word, which can 
mean what you want it to mean, in this case carries the implication that there has been some sort 
of conspiracy, racial gatekeeping or politically incorrect neglect by universities.”6 
 
These statements about transformation are attempting to take the discussion beyond identity 
politics, which in post-liberation South Africa officially continues with the discredited apartheid 
categories of ‘African’ (black, South African), ‘white’ (of European descent), ‘coloured’ (mixed 
race) and ‘Asian’ (Indian). These racial categories continue to regulate access to social resources, 
identity and job prospects.7 The general discourse that these three commentators seek to address 
is well articulated by many critics who argue that the relocation of the racial boot from one foot to 
the other has yet to occur in any significant way. 
The victimological framework that has been created generates recurring complaints at South 
African meetings about “discrimination in publishing,” among other alleged exclusionary practices, 
all deemed to be irrevocably racist. These complaints hinge on the perceived lack of racial and 
gender representation, a lack of ‘transformation,’ and perceptions about the use of peer review 
as censorship.8
My objective in approaching this highly vexed issue is not to take sides between the two extremes 
– characterised on the one hand by empirically based classical (Western)-style science, regulated 
by notions of objectivity and absolute, knowable truth; and, on the other, an alter-ego inquiry that 
recognises its own subjectivity, sense of being and researcher position. My goal goes beyond the 
phenomenological by delving into ontological issues that inquire how different epistemic cultures 
make sense by navigating different Subject–Object relationships, or what might be termed by 
some as essentialist modes of thought. Given these complexities and contradictions, solutions are 
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not on offer here. Rather, my aim is to identify and confront the issues, however difficult they may 
be, without painting readers into one corner or another.  
When linked to identity politics and the occult, the clash of paradigms often underpins the 
epistemological tectonics described below, and as much as I have tried to avoid a tendency to 
African exceptionalism, I cannot guarantee success. My approach is primarily interpreted through 
my own practice as a journal editor and author, from which my examples are drawn. Learning what 
can be learned from the extremes is perhaps all that one can accomplish in terms of managing 
the peer-review process across different paradigms, antagonistic ontologies and epistemological 
communities. 
RACE, IDENTITY AND HEMISPHERICAL DOMINANCE 
In South Africa, common sense presumes that racism is present wherever race-based demographic 
proportionality is absent.9 Whites, of course, are intrinsically associated with Europe and European 
colonisation. In questioning epistemological hemispherical dominance, Pearl Sithole writes that “[f]
ar from maintaining equality between reviewer and reviewed, the peer review process is dominated 
by scholars allied to Western models of knowledge production, who use their ‘gateway’ positions 
to marginalise and discourage African schools of thought.”10 Sithole further asserts that local or 
indigenous knowledge is (negatively or derisively) equated with “subjective” analysis, and that 
objectivity is an often inappropriate Western export that defines who gets published.11 “Viewpoint 
discrimination” and asymmetrical representation on international editorial boards of scholars 
based in developing countries are additional concerns.12 In psychology, for example, 96 percent 
of examples in journal articles are sourced from countries that constitute only 12 percent of the 
global population. These 12 percent findings are then often inappropriately generalised across the 
human population as a whole.13 
This article deals with paradigmatic, ontological and ideological issues that result in what Willard 
V O Quine calls the “indeterminacy of radical translation,” the purportedly different grounds for 
practice through which interpreters make sense of their linguistically different, often incompatible, 
ontological worlds.14 Discrimination is perceived within both realms by aggrieved authors. The 
concept of ‘indeterminacy’ is used to connote the sense of uncertainty, instability and lack of 
agreement between different meanings. Quine argues that there can be multiple translations of a 
single sentence, resulting in different meanings in parts or wholes of sentences.  
For example, earlier drafts of this paper (now published in Junctures) submitted for publication and 
circulated for comment have starkly highlighted the kinds of indeterminacies at work. Reviewer 
comments for the South African Journal of Science (SAJS), where an earlier version of this paper was 
first submitted, ranged from “philosophically sophisticated” on the one hand to “condescending” 
on the other – the latter reviewer vigorously denied the role of structures, recruitment, methods, 
outcomes and institutional ideologies in influencing research practice. Another reviewer accused 
me of “intellectual dereliction” for articulating (with the help of my Zimbabwean colleague Nyasha 
Mboti) a structurationist perspective that seeks to understand the discrimination that so many 
Africans feel with regard to the institutional cultures, policies and managerial procedures in which 
they feel trapped (feelings evocatively described by Sithole below).  
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The idea that knowledge (or, in the positivist framework, ‘Truth’) could be relational, constructed and 
negotiated between different scientific discursive (and often, faith-led) communities is hard to fathom 
when the critic is embedded in the data-led hegemonic scientistic discourse of validity, reliability 
and objectivity, and/or monological reasoning. In transgressing this framework and adopting one 
like ‘cultural studies,’ one reviewer pondered how to assess “scholarly rigour despite these different 
world views.” Added to the paradigmatic fog is the question of identity politics – some argue that 
discrimination resides in the machinations of senior academics and white (and sometimes black) 
men who personally deny access to emergent scholars and non-Western viewpoints.
Research Africa,15 for example, reported that senior African academics stand accused of 
monopolising South African journals, impeding young researchers from access. Among those who 
spoke out against this exclusion at the Southern African–Nordic Centre Third Bi-Annual International 
Conference (Johannesburg) was Howard Rachman, research director of the University of Limpopo. 
Referring to an article in the Sunday Times, Rachman is reported to have told delegates at a session 
on socially responsive Africa-centred research that “[t]here is a mafia control of publishing houses” 
(personal communication, 26 January 2011). Senior academics “hog” journals, the biochemist 
claimed. “Some people publishing in the journals are also on the editorial board and don’t permit 
entry into these journals. This makes it difficult for young researchers to publish.” He added that 
international publishers often dismissed manuscripts from African scholars as being unrelated to 
current academic debates. “They say they don’t conform to Western norms and expectations.”
My own argument, however, is that the issues run much deeper than such impressionist claims 
about normativity. We need to examine not only the disaffected feelings of a growing constituency 
of increasingly vocal black academics, but also ask how the knowledge project is actually managed. 
In addition, we need to examine how and why Western concepts of science and philosophy continue 
to dominate the South African academic milieu in the face of the massive class, ontological and 
cultural changes that have affected the academy since the mid-1990s.
 
The apportioning of “blame,” as one reviewer wrote of a much earlier, shorter commentary on peer 
review that I submitted a decade ago, also to SAJS, is not my intention. Neither do I want to justify 
my own class and racial determinations, nor my identity. My objective is to bridge ways of thinking 
and doing, and in the process to address the vexed issue of the practice of peer review, which itself 
is often a contradictory negotiation of what is finally agreed upon as the ultimate opinion, itself a 
dynamic and never-ending quest.16  
Paradigm clash is the issue. Unusually for a cultural studies scholar, my own research draws on both 
positivist (including statistical) and interpretivist (constructionist) paradigms; thus the ambiguities 
and contradictions so perceptively identified by one of my critics will no doubt be evident in this 
analysis also. But, as this reviewer concluded, “the problem must be confronted and debated.” 
Thanks to this initial reviewer of the shorter draft originally submitted to SAJS in 2007, I have 
thoroughly revised this version and, by applying an autoethnographic methodology, I hope to be able 
to speak to scholars across antagonistic paradigms and researcher positions. As already admitted, 
agreed-on solutions cannot be anticipated. 
Questions of evidence, data and findings are characteristic of objective social science. By contrast, 
the ‘lived’ methods approach often applied in cultural studies work, which sometimes rejects 
the value of data altogether,17 is exemplified by Nyasha Mboti, who argues that according to this 
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approach there are no findings to be found: “Dialogue fails as long as objectivity shields the 
researcher from the researched’s gaze. Too often, ‘scientific’ research speaks-to without listening-
to. Research ‘findings,’ also, are monologic because it is the researched who has been found, never 
the neutral(ised) researcher. Prodigality means that we have, finally, outgrown our own objectivity 
as researchers.”18
  
In contesting what is assumed to be a Western scientific monologue, Sithole’s book, which I invoke 
as a brief case study, reproduces as chapters examples of three of her unrevised rejected articles. 
Appended to each are the peer review reports and brief author–editor correspondence. Sithole 
expects readers to make up their own minds on the data (articles) and evidence (peer-review 
reports) presented, along with her introduction and conclusion. 
Are editors, editorial boards and publishing houses really co-conspirators?   
SOUR GRAPES OR VALID ACCUSATION? 
The argument set out below draws on my own experience of editing and publishing in academic 
journals since the mid-1970s, as an author in many languages in translation, and as an editorial board 
member for over 30 titles globally, including many published within Africa itself. While sympathising 
with emergent scholars trying to start a publishing career, I do not agree that editorial boards a priori 
conspire with regard to inclusion and exclusion. Other factors – ontology, paradigmatic preference, 
convention and ideology – are usually at work. These centre on the issue of power and who gets to 
legitimate meaning. In very recent post-colonial societies like South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, 
the racial issues are always sharper than in those African societies that obtained independence half 
a century earlier.
My own experiences of rejection, and of how different editors enable or disable submissions, are 
offered as illustration of the conditions under which all authors work.19 The situations described 
below need to be constructively engaged, rather than disseminating conspiracies of the powerful 
and the racist. Early in my career, as an MA student and tutor in the late 1970s, I submitted a short 
article to the SAJS. It offered an Einsteinian space–time approach to the study of narrative through 
the application of semiological film theory. The paper was rejected, the editor told me and my 
supervisor, because it was not experimental, but philosophical. (Nowadays, this journal publishes 
commentaries, interventions and editorials, philosophy and even biographies. My timing was off 
by 35 years!) The article was subsequently accepted by a publication edited by my supervisor. 
The moment his editorial term expired, however, the still-to-be-published but accepted essay was 
rejected by the new editor, from the same university. Repeated requests for reviewer reports were 
ignored, as clearly I had been caught between two bulls in the same “kraal” (Afrikaans, ‘cattle 
enclosure’).
An example of a different order involved a statistically based study submitted to Nature that 
attracted a blunt, unexplained rejection just three hours after submission. The study was however 
published as a Nature Precedings and, at last checking, had secured 305 citations.20 As with many 
high-impact titles (for example, Science, Current Biology, Nature), peer-review of submissions is not 
automatic. An editor assesses whether or not submissions are of ‘sufficient interest’ to the journal’s 
wide readership. Seemingly, our topic failed these two criteria to make it into the formal journal, 
notwithstanding it being cited in its pre-published Precedings form. 
92 Junctures 20, December 2019
The second-ranked Science issued a terse rejection note for the same submission just five hours 
after receipt. In contrast, Psychological Science responded three months after uploading, offering 
very comprehensive reviewer and editor assessment. Unlike the alienation from our labour that 
we experienced with Nature and Science, the article was considerably enhanced by the intensive 
dialogical manner in which the Psychological Science editors engaged with us over two more drafts.21 
According to my psychology colleagues, in addressing the difficulties of obtaining publication for 
studies that incorporate non-Western samples, the discipline needs to address the bias shown in 
its broad literature toward the study of participants located in environments unrepresentative of the 
majority of the global population. They point to psychology’s overreliance on a narrow participant 
pool, and emphasise the necessity of conducting research with diverse populations. They conclude 
that high-impact-factor child developmental journals are heavily skewed toward publishing articles 
that incorporate data from WEIRD (Westernised, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Democratic) 
populations. The habitual dependence on convenience sampling that lacks diversity means that 
culturally specific findings are being misattributed as universal traits.22
The oft-cited allegation of ‘old boys clubs’ or mafia-like conspiracies are diversionary, however. 
Understanding how academic publication works requires knowledge of publishing and peer-
reviewing practices across publishing cultures that uphold different scholarly conventions, peer-
reviewing procedures and ways of doing things.  
Beyond these technicalities is the issue of paradigm clash – broadly, indeterminacies of translation 
– to which I now turn. Expressed differently, this clash occurs because conventional scientific 
systems are presumed to offer amoral codes that exist in and of themselves. African approaches, in 
contrast, sometimes explicitly relate moral codes to systems of both interpretation and verification. 
The second elaborated draft of the third iteration of this paper was emphatically accepted in 2018 
by two reviewers engaged by the SAJS, but rejected by the humanities section editor on the basis 
of appropriate readership – better found elsewhere – while she also had some niggling issues 
with my African linguistics framework. (This now-published Junctures version is the fourth version.) 
My impression was that the SAJS editor thought that my analysis would get more traction from 
a different epistemological community, rather than the positivist science one to whom it was 
intentionally addressed. Then along came the invitation from Junctures.
The sections that follow introduce a more philosophical dimension in teasing out the question of 
indeterminacy. 
THE ISSUE OF CERTAINTY 
René Descartes was the progenitor of a whole series of attempts to overcome certain pervasive 
dilemmas that evolved out of the ferment of the Renaissance, the Reformation and the spread 
of secular literacy.23 He questioned the authority of previous philosophers as he did of his own 
senses. The dilemmas he faced involve the ways in which power no longer emanated from 
hereditary European centres controlled by restricted classes or castes of literate elites. Extending 
the capacity to record one’s own experience enables the comparison of records and, thereby, 
judgement. Cartesian doubt of one’s lived experience offers one way of validating the latter, while 
also placing limits on the kinds of experience in everyday life that qualify as grounds for negatively 
judging encountered authority.
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The Western hereditary centres tend to label African-based (or other local) knowledge as 
‘different,’ as ‘area studies,’ or even as irrelevant. Local knowledge is often insufficiently leveraged 
by, and lacks integration into, global theoretical discussion. This knowledge is thus impeded 
from actively de-stabilising conventional ‘Northern’ thought, defamiliarising what is taken-for-
granted, and revitalising ossified paradigms rooted in positivism. My own work using self-reflexivity, 
autoethnography and critical indigenous qualitative methods, for example, often attracts bewildered 
(and sometimes vicious) peer criticism because the research teams I work with cast a critical eye 
as much on their own research practices as they do on their ‘objects of study’ and actual research 
outcomes.24 My team and I thus share with Sithole something of an indeterminate conceptual 
space, but for different reasons and under different conditions. The academy and its practices 
(such as peer review) are grounded in norms stemming from earlier European conventions. The 
medium articulates the relations of its origin. 
THE MIND–BODY PROBLEM 25
The problem of Other Minds highlights logical, ontological and epistemological differences. This 
observation is based on modern nominalism that assumes that abstract ideas and universals have 
no independent existence and that they exist only as names (nominalism).26 
Mind (consciousness, intelligence and so on) resides in a non-material substance that does all 
the thinking, resident within the human body’s rather more material substantiality. This raises, 
of course, the (in)famous Cartesian mind–body problem. Revolutionary in its day, the logic of 
Descartes’ separation of mental and material added much to the groundwork on which grew the 
Enlightenment. God’s existence, the previous reasoning went, was the prime guarantor of the 
individual human being’s capacity for rational and moral thought. Descartes enabled subsequent 
thinkers to pay greater attention to the role of reason in human affairs. One should not, however, 
confuse the freedom offered to others by the dualism of mind and matter with the potential for 
greater clarity in everyday life.
Perhaps the single most persistent effect of the seventeenth century’s philosophical revolutions 
is the positivist doctrine that there exists a singularly comprehensible rational order of things 
accessible to human intellect, capable of being institutionalised through hereditary centres in the 
form of a wholly rational order of human endeavour. The conception of ideas like ‘human rights,’ 
‘national sovereignty’ and the ‘separation of powers’ (the intellectual bases of modern political 
thought) is one outcome of this paradigm. 
Sithole, as I read her, dismisses the Enlightenment assumption of a single human rationality 
in the subtitle of her book, “The politics of discourse management in the social sciences.” She 
argues that this (hereditary) rationality is not innate, normal or natural, but is managed, mainly via 
North–Western impulses, where “the knowledge production field [is] trapped in the vanguard of a 
certain generation of peers who do not allow for diversification of discourses.” She concludes that 
this vanguard “is also trapped in global apartheid of systems of thought that ensure that Africa 
applies theories and models of analysis from elsewhere.” Sithole further concludes that “The NRF 
[National Research Foundation], the HSRC [Human Sciences Research Council] and the whole 
system of [South African] Higher Education continues to subscribe to an international ideological 
censoring machine where academic excellence is only defined by publishing in specific journals 
that are dominated by White males mostly from Europe and America.”27
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If Sithole is correct, then all other counter and alternative rationalities, including IKS discourses, 
must also be understood as similarly constructed and managed by different re-emergent hereditary 
constituencies, whether or not they are labelled as ‘indigenous,’ ‘national,’ or ‘cultural.’ Is this 
not the terrain on which global knowledge production is grounded? Science, like anything, is a 
contested terrain and what is required to negotiate differences are rules of engagement provided 
by the mechanisms of paradigm and paradigm shift.28 The recent emergence of critical indigenous 
qualitative methodologies is one productive example of such engagement that is beginning to 
dismantle – if currently in certain sites only – the “double absolute,” where soul and body are 
understood as two separate substances.29
Beginning with Hobbes,30 the conviction emerged that no matter the material condition of women 
and men, they will follow the path of right reason once this has been revealed to them. Apartheid 
common sense discourse, for example, held that if its critics came to South Africa and “saw for 
themselves,” then right reason would prevail. The method is replicated in the (counter) purpose 
of Sithole’s book. By exposing subjugated academics to the rational (indigenous) alternative right 
reason, it is assumed that the force managed by the “censoring crew”31 will be discredited and the 
old order replaced with the new or alternative (black African) indigenous order.  
However, caution is indicated. When summarily rejecting the achievements of the Enlightenment, 
such as occurs in many of the North–Western ‘postie’ approaches (post-structuralism, post-
modernism, post-disciplinarity and so on), pitfalls need to be negotiated. The steady entrenchment 
of rights-based law and the bloody but still tangible operation of the international political sphere 
both derive from the Enlightenment. Without its inheritance, it is difficult to conceive of an idea 
like ‘crimes against humanity’ (of which apartheid was one) and associated international law, 
under which the more egregious of tyrants can be brought to some semblance of justice. The 
post-modern criticism of the Enlightenment is not without merit – once all the undisciplined jargon 
has been stripped away. The post-modern critique holds that an order based on purely rational 
principles cannot account for the local, personal, historical and cultural (including religious) needs 
and interests of ordinary people caught up in the play of these grand forces of reason. For people 
beyond Europe, Enlightenment reason is not always reasonable. 
This is perhaps what lies at the root of Sithole’s argument about the lack of ‘transformation’ in 
the South African social sciences and their global reliance on North–Western epistemologies. The 
signifier ‘Africa,’ as examined by Valentin Mudimbe32 via Michel Foucault’s33 criticism of the context 
of arbitration, demonstrates that the social, political and cultural differences between geopolitical 
imaginaries like Africa and ‘the North’ are a result of the historical absorption into European 
discourse of Descartes’ dualism of mind and matter. This must follow from the institutionalisation 
of the dichotomy of the human and natural sciences, in which the human subject resists being an 
object of what Sithole interprets as the arbitrational judgement of those who hold political power 
over institutional (that is, publishing) controls. 
IKS seems to offer a discourse responding to this particular political moment. In an often 
prelapsarian unreflective form, scholars collapse who they are (identity) with what they claim to 
know. This assumes that “minds can only communicate through bodies.”34 Such knowledge is 
performed (through dramaturgy, oratory, identity politics) rather than mediated solely through 
empirically demonstrated or theoretically argued frameworks that require different kinds of 
communicative strategies and environments.
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IKS evokes a communal cultural memory that resides in the equivalent (but un-theorised) Jungian 
concept of the collective unconscious.35 For science, IKS might present itself as intuitive, an 
emotive and essentialist discourse in which individuals try to culturally locate themselves in 
dual periodised and ontological dimensions. The first is modernity, the second is an imagined, 
often pre-modern (anti-Western) ontological dynamical world. The result, sometimes, might be a 
contradictory consciousness in which a discursively fixed indigeneity prevails as public memory 
over the contemporary reality of a hyper-individuated, consumer-led, post-modern subjectivity. 
To use a stereographical metaphor, such individuals encounter both periods simultaneously, but 
want others to reside within (or at least recognise) their reconstruction of a different particularistic 
ontology deriving from a dissimilar but intersecting imagined past. In the Christian North–West, 
such an idealism is found in the representational form of Eden before the Fall and/or the Theory of 
Intelligent Design (Creationism). It may be argued that IKS, like religion and alternative medicine, 
require different systems of verification. 
Nevertheless, questions remain:  
i. what are the parameters within which particular indigenous knowledge systems 
can be assessed? Too often, outsiders are expected to either ‘know’ or accept a 
statement because it is a priori IKS. Outsiders from the hereditary centres need 
to be invited in if they are to engage constructively with such arguments and to 
enable paradigm shift;   
ii. how to validate the results and to share them for the good of the general critical 
citizenry; and 
iii. how to valorise in a non-essentialist manner the ‘evidence of experience’ claimed 
by self-referential researchers.36
While even critical IKS proponents tend to perform and live their approach,37 scientists conventionally 
require hard evidence, explicit method, objectivity and logical argument. IKS was on the agenda 
of the Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf) Consensus Study on the Humanities, on which 
paneI I and Sithole served.38 After considerable debate, however, the topic was excluded by the 
panel’s convenors from the final report, partly, I suspect, because the issues of indeterminacy and 
essentialism could not be resolved. 
An illustration from the files of Critical Arts encapsulates the problem. This involved an article 
about female genital mutilation written by a self-declared African woman based in the North–
Atlantic region. As editor, my assessment was that the initial reviews indicated that the paper was 
worth developing in the context of debates on the topic, though requiring substantial revision. It 
lacked lucidity and awareness of the journal’s readership, and was contradictory, poorly written 
and lacked substantiating evidence. The reviewers included a Kenyan male and a Canadian 
female who were researching similar issues in East and Southern Africa. Though most editors 
would have immediately rejected the article, the author was accorded an option for substantive 
revision, received the very next morning. This author rejected the reports as being part of an 
archaic paradigm. The lack of evidence, she said, was inconsequential as the piece was based on 
her own experiences as an insider. If so, we responded that she needed to rigorously problematise 
her research/author position through self-reflexivity and/or autoethnography, while addressing 
reviewer concerns. 
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The third revision was judged to be unpublishable. In the author’s opinion, Critical Arts had “adopted 
the language of academia/rigour/evidence.” In contrast, as an insider, supposedly unburdened by 
the (seemingly conservative, archaic) practices of the academy, the author concluded (incorrectly) 
that the reviewers were dismissive of knowledge based solely on lived experience, rather than 
located “in books.” For her, this African journal embodied the (Southern) gatekeeper of conventional 
knowledge practices.
In contrast to this experience, Critical Arts had earlier published a well-written paper arguing the 
merits of “female circumcision” authored by an African, male, a Nigerian, working in the United 
States. Our two feminist reviewers, who disagreed implacably with Frank Ukadike’s39 assumptions 
and arguments, nevertheless concluded that the author had in a revision constructively engaged 
their extensive criticisms, ironically, in the process, strengthening his argument for such circumcision 
– described by its critics as genital mutilation. Ukadike’s paper was accepted because it elaborated 
historical contexts and associated philosophies, and thus merited further critique. Yet, no-one to 
my knowledge has taken such an opportunity to engage Ukadike’s arguments. This is an example 
where indeterminacy was applied by means of affirmative viewpoint discrimination in publishing an 
argument with which no-one on the Critical Arts editorial board concurred.  
EPISTEMOLOGICAL INDETERMINACY 
To repeat, indeterminacy refers to scientific concepts of uncertainty and is related to Kant’s idea 
of the noumenon – that which is scientifically unknowable or explainable.40 Kant’s reformulation of 
mind–matter dualism posited a material noumenal world, in conjunction with a world of intelligible 
mental objects which are phenomenal and knowable as such. But since the noumenal world is 
non-mental, it is unknowable. Science results from the activity of ‘understanding.’ Scientists thus 
make judgements on matters as they are relevant to these distinctions, or they express opinion: 
the former is to be seen as a truth-claim, the latter being of a lower order. Indeterminate ‘things-
in-themselves’ are unquantifiable, and thus do not lend themselves to being ‘tested.’ This is why 
scientists (and lawyers) try to eliminate indeterminate terms and observations from their analyses. 
The grammars of African languages arguably ascribe greater agency to the equivalents of the 
(sometimes radically) materialistic objects enshrined in the languages of historically industrialised 
nations. Their grammars have a place for qualifying an existent in terms of its subjective 
relatedness to the other things, persons and animals around it. Subject and Object thus become 
interchangeable, in much the same way as occurred in the medieval scholastic realism of pre-
modern Europe. In thus retaining spaces for the authority of the spirits and the ancestors, for 
example, these grammatical syntheses also permit speakers to ascribe some measure of reality to 
the powerful influence of the memory of the spoken word. 
It seems that some essentialist strands of the IKS paradigm are embedded in these kinds of 
relations. In South Africa especially, these IKS threads draw on a number of so-called a priori 
African values, of which the most commonly cited is ubuntu (communitarianism).41 This concept 
of shared lived relations is mostly discussed in the academic literature as self-evident, Africanist 
and contemporarily relevant. It is presented as a series of propositions, as a kind of analytical 
philosophy that exists in and of itself – no matter the mayhem of many of the African societies in 
which this idealist set of prescriptions are played out. Critiques of this framework – which assumes 
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an African exceptionalism and which can result in the tyranny of the individual over the community 
– are few and far between.42 Nkonko Kamwangamalu’s pan-African linguistic analysis stands 
almost alone as a basis for the concept claiming communitarian ontology. 43  
The existence of a plurality of ontological referents in African languages is based on the notion 
of ntu. This root word stems from the Bantu languages and connotes a sense of ‘personhood,’ 
acknowledging the humanity of the individual. Alexis Kagame44 expanded on the notion of 
“Being” that Placide Temples had detected in African languages. According to Temples, the Bantu 
conception reflects the belief that the “beings-forces” of the universe exist in a relationship in 
which nothing moves without influencing other forces by its movement: “The world of forces is held 
like a spider’s web of which no single thread can be caused to vibrate without shaking the whole 
network.”45 By using analyses and methods based on Aristotle’s Physics, Kagame identified a four-
level grid by means of which the Bantu verbal root ntu could be described. Reality is ordered by 
Kagame into levels of influence situated between the concepts of muntu (being with intelligence), 
where IKS be might located, kintu (being without intelligence), hantu (location in space and time) 
and kuntu (roughly, modality, the way in which something happens and is experienced).46
In light of these indeterminacies, for Sithole to pursue her project, she may have to take the route 
she took with her book. However, she would need to argue her case dialectically in dialogue with 
dualistic Cartesian (kintu, where knowledge arises only though scientific method) approaches, 
such that she herself (kuntu) is enabled to enter into a sustained negotiation with editors (hintu) 
and journals to persuade them of both the value and existence of muntu (being with intelligence) 
and prodigality (having outgrown objectivity).  
PASSING THROUGH THE GATES 
Critique remains crucial, no matter the paradigm. Reducing the issue to gatekeeping, by ‘White 
Men,’ mafia editors, and racism, forgets that many of these editors have not only created spaces for 
different ontological perspectives in their journals, but that they are also embedded in institutional 
discourses and practices that to some extent circumscribe their editorial policies and publishing 
economies. The failure resides in the institutions whose gates they may be required to keep. Gates 
function as both entry and exit points. Beyond the ‘gates’ lie institutions that are not dependent on 
the race of the gatekeeper. A Black male, suggests Mboti in discussion with me, will make as good 
a gatekeeper as a White male, as long as the institution whose gates they keep remains unchanged 
and/or regulated, as occurs through the regular audits of South African journals conducted by the 
Academy of Science for South Africa.47 When singling out the perceived gatekeepers for special 
critique, we cannot see the forest for the trees, or the disease for the symptom. The gatekeeper is 
embedded in a variety of often determining institutional, procedural and regulatory relations that 
deal with the nature of science, data, ethical regimes, peer review, performance management and 
so on.  
Publishing economies need to develop theoretical frameworks for making sense of the managerial 
opacity of institutions whose software systems sometimes fail to recognise the political–economic 
effects of measurement and reward systems that shape scientific practices and publishing 
economies.48 The struggle waged in South Africa by performing and arts practitioners and scholars 
for recognition of their creations as ‘research publications’ is a case in point.49 For them, research is 
lived in the performance – not necessarily of the Self, but through the text and in bodily expression.
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In what way is doing a painting (knowing ‘about’) the same as doing/knowing/writing (doing 
‘that’) research? Research practice can be monitored because it works according to particular 
conventions (mostly encoded in one kind of script or another). The transposition of words from 
one (epistemological) language that is radically different to another always carries a special kind 
of indeterminacy, because the Being (existential significance) of the referent of common nouns 
does not necessarily carry the same objectivity in all cultural-linguistic contexts. Meanings are 
observed and documented, and threaded through different kinds of sign systems, including the 
speaker, ontological and subject positions identified by Kagame. It is then possible to explain why 
interpretations by Northern (peer-) reviewers may be sometimes incomprehensible to authors 
located in other contexts.
Globally, world views necessarily include a high degree of indeterminacy and opacity in the way 
that expected interpretants will be generated. This is because there will always be one subject 
(for example, the scholar) seeing a “whole undissociated common sense” object, and at least 
one other (the subjects being reported) experiencing a dynamic relation of force, as accounted 
for in the experience of ntu. Western scientific perspectives derived from the Enlightenment and 
industrialism, a mode of production which is a logical consequence of Cartesian thought, assume 
determinateness, ‘objectivity’ and transparency. The second dimension incorporates indigenous 
frames of reference which retain Subject–Object integration (kuntu). The Western notion of 
‘objectivity’ has little purchase among many African scholars as its ‘authors’ are considered (or 
consider themselves) to be part of the stories they tell. In post-Enlightenment thought, such a 
research position can be acknowledged by means of the emergent paradigm of critical indigenous 
qualitative methodologies that include autoethnography.
Such is the nature of paradigm engagement and shift. The Enlightenment practice of dialogue 
and debate offers a more productive route than simply presenting rejected articles and reviewer 
reports as they are, as if all issues are self-evident to all communities of readers. Reluctance 
to debate results in a monologue. Monologues are useful and engaging, and often entertaining, 
but they are undialectical. Monologues deal with the past, dialogues and dialectics address the 
future. Because dialogues are collective in nature, there are many minds at work. Extending 
the empowerment of the capacity to record one’s own experience makes it possible to compare 
records, and to judge them. Authors, peer reviewers, readers and editors are the key constituents 
of this contested and discursive (if unequal) productive triangle. Epistemological progress occurs 
when we manoeuvre through the contradictions by keeping the conversation alive.   
One outcome of humanities research is that the findings of projects are absorbed by subject 
communities. Thus, to test a hypothesis about some quality or aspect of communities in and on 
a community of scholars is in part to teach that community that such a quality or aspect offers 
some possible advantage to the commodiousness of their writing. In terms of research practice, 
academics who try to diffuse subject-generated knowledge not based on objective science, as is 
taken for granted by specific journals, find themselves at odds with editors. Editors – a group of 
subjects usually embedded in the epistemological assumptions of Western hereditary centres – 
are thus seen by critics like Sithole to be engaging in exclusion of the dissemination of knowledge 
that is not-science in the ways in which they understand it. One of the requirements of authors 
is that they negotiate the indeterminacy, open-endedness and opacity of radical translation in 
eventually securing publication.
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The transposition of words from one paradigmatic language that is radically different to another 
always carries a special kind of indeterminacy of translation. This occurs because the Being 
(existential significance) of the referent of common nouns does not necessarily carry the same 
objectivity in all cultural-linguistic contexts. Advice given by reviewers occurs in accordance 
with the entirety of knowledge that they have personally accumulated over their careers. This, 
itself, can be influenced by the particular moods and the ‘ontological space’ occupied by the 
peer reviewer. When peer reviewers offer conflicting views it is the job of the editor or editorial 
coordinator to consider contending positions via Kagame’s principle of prodigality and to advise 
authors accordingly. Sometimes, such prodigality might open up new points of discussion. Action 
and practitioner research should be “[p]luralistic, rather than monolithic, and diverse, rather than 
constrained, so that they [editors] can celebrate the unique, personal, and subjective strengths of 
individual research and help researchers display their own personal signatures.”50 
We may all be speaking and writing in English here, but the issue is how to bridge epistemological, 
ontological and epistemic indeterminacy. ‘Conspiracy’ theories are limited in their explanatory value 
and they disorientate authors who hold them. Sithole has made one valiant attempt to bridge the 
differences. The protagonists and antagonists, however, need to engage each other dialectically 
in terms of epistemological issues, journal reviewing practices, the political economy of publishing 
and institutional research policies. These differences are not easy to resolve as science vests 
authority in method and theory, while IKS tends to vest the authority of knowledge within the 
Self, the knower. Where autoethnography is critical of the self in relation to that being lived and 
experienced, some approaches to IKS do not lend themselves to scientific testing or dialectical 
debate. This is a substantive issue that still needs attention in terms that get beyond claims of 
conspiracy on the part of (some) editorial boards.  
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